Top 30 Supreme Court Judgments of 2025 for AILET PG 2026

5 Aug 2025 Read 35194 Views

Preparing for AILET PG 2026? Then you can’t afford to miss the most important Supreme Court judgments delivered in 2025!

Whether it's the constitutional validity of arrest powers, the rights of senior citizens, or the latest developments in arbitration, family law, and criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has delivered significant rulings this year.

In this power-packed blog, we’ve curated the Top 30 landmark judgments of 2025, simplified and carefully selected for their relevance to AILET PG 2026. Bookmark it for your revision sprint!

Case 1: Court’s power to modify an arbitral award

Case Name: Gayatri Balasamy v M/s ISG Novasoft

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996	Sec 34: Allows courts to set aside an arbitral award on specific grounds. Sec 37: Provides for appeals against orders under Section 34. Sec 31(7)(b): Pertains to the interest payable on the sum directed to be paid by the arbitral award. Sec 33: Allows the arbitral tribunal to correct any computational, clerical, or typographical errors in the award.
Constitution	Art 142: Enforcement of Supreme Court Decrees and Orders

Issue:

(i) Whether Indian courts possess the authority to modify arbitral awards under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, specifically under Sections 34 and 37.

Facts:

Ms. Gayatri Balasamy was appointed as Vice President at ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. She tendered her resignation, alleging sexual harassment by the CEO.
Her resignation was not accepted, and over the next year, she received three termination letters. Ms. Balasamy filed criminal complaints against the CEO and Vice-President for offenses under the IPC and the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act.
ISG Novasoft filed counter-complaints alleging defamation and extortion.
The Supreme Court referred the dispute to arbitration and the arbitral tribunal awarded Ms. Balasamy Rs 2 crore.
Madras High Court (single-judge bench) modified the award, granting an additional Rs. 1.6 crore.
Subsequently, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court reduced this additional amount to Rs 50,000.
Ms. Balasamy filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court challenging the division bench's decision.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, held that courts possess a limited power under Sections 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act to modify an arbitral award.

Majority Opinion:

Severability: If an award contains distinct parts, and one part is invalid, courts can sever the invalid portion and uphold the valid part.
Correction of Errors: Courts can correct clerical, typographical, or computational errors apparent on the face of the award.
Modification of Post-Award Interest: Under Section 31(7) (b), courts can modify the rate or period of post-award interest if it is found to be exorbitant or contrary to law.
Invocation of Article 142: In exceptional cases, the Supreme Court can invoke Article 142 to modify an arbitral award to ensure complete justice.
Distinction from Appellate Power: The power to modify is not akin to appellate jurisdiction.

Dissenting Opinion (Justice K.V. Viswanathan): Sections 34 and 37 do not grant courts the power to modify arbitral awards. The Act, unlike its 1940 predecessor, consciously omits any provision for modification, indicating legislative intent to limit judicial intervention.

Allowing modification would blur the lines between setting aside an award and appellate review, which is not permissible under the Act.
The power under Article 142 should not be used to circumvent statutory limitations.

Case 2: 3 years of practice must for Civil Judge (Jr. Division) eligibility

Case Name: All India Judges Association v Union of India

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Constitution	Art 217: Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court Art 233: Appointment of district judges
Bar Council of India Regulations

Issues:

(i) Whether the requirement of having a minimum of three years' practice for appearing in the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination, which was previously done away with, needs to be restored.

(ii) If restored, whether the practice period should be calculated from the date of provisional enrollment/registration or from the date of passing the All India Bar Examination (AIBE).

Facts:

This case is a continuation of the long-standing "All India Judges Association" litigation (1989), dealing with judicial service conditions and entry qualifications.
In 2002 (Third AIJA Case), the Supreme Court had removed the mandatory 3-year practice rule for fresh law graduates entering judicial service.
However, based on observations from various High Courts regarding issues with inexperienced judges, the Court revisited this decision in the current case.

Petitioner's Arguments:

Most High Courts, in their affidavits, agreed that the minimum three years' experience at the Bar for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination needs to be restored. Reasons cited included:
Lack of practical experience leading to difficulties in handling procedural issues, court proceedings, and urgent orders.
Behavioural and temperamental problems observed in fresh law graduates.
The belief that actual practicing experience is "invaluable and irreplaceable.'
Practical exposure acquaints judges with the duties of all stakeholders and brings sensitivity to human problems.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court decided to restore the requirement of prior practice for Civil Judge (Junior Division) and issued the following directions:

Mandatory 3-year practice: Candidates for Civil Judge (Junior Division) must have practised for a minimum period of 3 years to be eligible for the examination.
Calculation of practice: The 3-year practice period will be calculated from the date of their provisional enrollment/registration with the concerned State Bar Council.
Proof of practice: Candidates must produce a certificate from an advocate with a minimum standing of 10 years, duly endorsed by the Principal Judicial Officer of the District/station (for Mofussil courts) or an officer designated by the High Court/Supreme Court (for High Court/Supreme Court practice).
Law Clerk Experience: Experience gained as Law Clerks with Judges or Judicial Officers will also be considered.
Prospective Application: This requirement will not affect selection processes already initiated before the judgment date but will apply from the next recruitment process.

Case 3: Using an additional language apart from the official language of the state is permissible

Case Name: Varshatai v State of Maharashtra

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022

Sec 3: Official language of Local Authorities.

Issue:

(i) Whether the High Court of Bombay was correct in concluding that the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022, does not prohibit the use of Urdu as an additional language on the signboard of a Municipal Council building in Maharashtra.

Facts:

A signboard of the new building of the Municipal Council in Maharashtra displayed the text "Municipal Council, Patur", in Marathi at the top, followed by its Urdu translation.
The appellant objected to the use of Urdu, contending that since Marathi was the official language of the State of Maharashtra, the work of the Municipal Council could only be conducted in Marathi.
Therefore, the use of Urdu in any manner was impermissible. The Municipal Council rejected these objections.
The appeal reached the High Court, which did not consider it a case calling for interference. Aggrieved, the appellant challenged the High Court's order before the Supreme Court.
During the appeal's pendency, the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022, was enacted. The appellant contended that under Section 3 of the 2022 Act, the use of Urdu on the Municipal Councils' signboard could not be permitted.

Judgment:

The Division Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, holding that there was no prohibition on the use of Urdu under the 2022 Act.

Looking for broader monthly legal updates after these major rulings? Check out the July 2025 legal current affairs roundup.

Case 4: Posting a poem promoting sacrifice & non-violence does not attract offences under BNS

Case Name: Imran Pratapgarhi v State of Gujarat

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Constitution	Art 19(1) (a): freedom of speech and expression
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita	Sec 196: Promoting enmity between different groups on ground of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.

Issues:

(i) Whether the recitation and posting of a poem by the appellant constituted offences under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

(il) Whether registration of the FIR violated the Appellant’s fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Facts:

The Appellant, a Member of the Rajya Sabha, had posted a video clip from a mass marriage ceremony at which a poem was recited.
The poem, in Urdu, metaphorically spoke of facing injustice with love and sacrificing personal losses for truth.
A complaint alleged that the poem incited enmity between communities, promoted hatred, and harmed national unity.
FIR was registered under Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57, and 3(5) of the BNS.
When the High Court dismissed the appellant's petition seeking the quashing of the FIR he approached the Supreme Court.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the FIR, and held that registration of the FIR regarding the posted poem was a mechanical exercise without application of mind. This amounted to a clear abuse of the process of law and violated the fundamental right of the appellant under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution.

Need a sharper view of constitutional freedoms under Article 19? Follow the detailed write‑up on Article 19 of the Indian Constitution for precise insights.

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Case 5: Timelines for Governors & the President on State Bills

Case Name: State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Constitution

Art 200: Assent to Bills

Art 201: Bills Reserved for the President

Art 142: Enforcement of Supreme Court Decrees and Orders

Art 163: Council of Ministers to Aid and Advise Governor

Issue:

(i) Whether the Governor of Tamil Nadu's prolonged inaction on 12 bills passed by the state legislature was constitutional.

Facts:

Between January 2020 and April 2023, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed 12 bills, most of them were about amending university laws.
These bills were duly forwarded to the Governor for assent, as mandated by Article 200 of the Constitution.
The Governor withheld assent on 10 bills and reserved 2 for the President's consideration, without providing timely responses.
The state government contended that this inaction was unconstitutional and impeded the state's legislative process.

Judgment:

a. Governor's Delay is Unconstitutional: Governor's prolonged inaction on the bills was "illegal and erroneous," violating the constitutional mandate.

b. Deemed Assent via Article 142: Invoking its powers under Article 142, the Court deemed the 10 bills, which were pending assent and those reserved for the President.

c. Timelines for Governor's Actions: The Court established specific timelines to ensure prompt action:

Withholding Assent or Reserving for President: Must be done within one month.
Returning a Bill for Reconsideration: If the Governor withholds assent against the advice of the Council of Ministers, the bill must be returned within three months.
Assenting to Re-passed Bills: Upon receiving a re-passed bill, the Governor must grant assent within one month.

d. No Absolute Veto Power: Governor does not possess an absolute veto under Article 200. Once a bill is re-passed by the legislature after being returned, the Governor is constitutionally obligated to grant assent.

e. Expansion of Judicial Review: Allowing courts to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Governor to perform constitutional duties when necessary.

To grasp safeguards against retrospective punishment, refer to the focused guide on Article 20 of the Constitution.

Case 6: Validity of exclusive jurisdiction clauses under Sec 28 of Contract Act

Case Name: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd & HDFC Bank v Deepti Bhatia

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Indian Contract Act, 1872	Sec 28: Agreements in restraint of legal proceeding void.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908	Sec 20: Territorial jurisdiction of civil courts. Order VII Rule 11: Rejection of plaint.

Issues:

(i) Whether exclusive jurisdiction clauses in employment contracts are barred by Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act.

(ii) Whether such clauses are enforceable in employment contracts, especially where there is unequal bargaining power?

(iii) Whether the Mumbai courts had proper jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC?

Facts:

Two employees of HDFC Bank Ltd., Rakesh Kumar Verma and Deepti Bhatia, were terminated from service.
Both challenged their terminations by filing suits in Patna and Delhi respectively, despite their employment contracts specifying exclusive jurisdiction of Mumbai courts.
HDFC Bank invoked the jurisdiction clause and sought rejection of the plaints under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
The Patna High Court upheld the jurisdiction clause and dismissed Rakesh’s plaint.
The Delhi High Court, however, rejected the clause and allowed Deepti’s suit to proceed.
Both orders were appealed before the Supreme Court. So, here are two cases- Rakesh Kumar Verma v. HDFC Bank Ltd. & HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Deepti Bhatia.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the HDFC Bank, affirming the validity of the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in both employment contracts. It held that the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in this case did not violate Section 28 of the Contract Act, the Mumbai courts had jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC, these clauses were agreed between the parties and the language of the clauses was clear and exclusive.

Therefore, the suits filed in Patna and Delhi were not maintainable, and the proper forum for adjudication was the courts in Mumbai, as agreed upon by the parties.

Want a comprehensive list of seminal constitutional judgments beyond 2025? Visit Top Landmark Judgments for a curated study.

Case 7: Reconsidering Senior Advocate designation criteria

Case Name: Jitender @ Kalla v State (NCT of Delhi)

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Advocates Act, 1961	Sec 16: Designation of Senior Advocates
Constitution	Art 14: Equality before law and equal protection of the law

Issues:

(i) Whether the criteria for designating Senior Advocates, especially length of practice, are rational and justifiable.

(ii) Whether the practice of different gowns for Senior Advocates has any legal basis under the Advocates Act.

Facts:

The case arose from a criminal appeal in which broader concerns about the designation process of Senior Advocates were raised.
A two-Judge Bench had earlier expressed doubts regarding the system established in Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India (2017) for Senior Advocate designation.
These concerns were placed before a three-Judge Bench by administrative order of the Chief Justice of India for deeper examination.

Judgment:

1. On Criteria for Senior Designation:

The Court held that standing at the Bar must be assessed based on qualities, not just years of experience.
Length of practice alone is not a rational criterion—someone may practice for years with minimal court engagement.
The Court emphasised a holistic evaluation of: Integrity, Fairness in Court, Respect for Judges & Peers, Mentorship, Pro bono work, Professional ethics, Ability and specialized legal knowledge.

2. On Senior Gown Practice: The Court observed that different gowns for Senior Advocates have no basis in the Advocates Act. It left the decision to discontinue this practice to the respective High Courts while framing rules.

Case 8: Limitation period in commercial appeals begins on pronouncement

Case Name: Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd v M/s. Heavy Electricals Limited

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Limitation Act, 1963	Sec 5: Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.
Commercial Courts Act, 2015	Sec 13 (1A): Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions.
Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act)	Order XX Rule 1(1): Judgment when pronounced.

Issues:

(i) Whether the limitation period for filing an appeal under the Commercial Courts Act begins from the date of pronouncement or the date of receipt of the judgment copy.

(ii) Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

(iii) Whether the provisions of Order XX Rule 1(1) CPC are mandatory in nature, such that limitation would start only after the judgment is served to the parties.

Facts:

The respondent, a Central Government company, had filed a civil suit against the appellants to recover over ₹26 crores with interest, based on an award from the MSME Council, Kanpur.
The Commercial Court, Ranchi, passed a judgment on the matter.
The appellants filed a statutory appeal 301 days late and applied for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which the Jharkhand High Court rejected for lack of "sufficient cause."
The appellants contended that the limitation period should commence only from the receipt of the certified copy of the judgment, relying on the language of Order XX Rule 1 CPC, which mandates courts to issue copies of judgments to parties.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the limitation period begins from the date of pronouncement of the judgment and not from the date of receipt of its certified copy, unless the litigant shows diligence in trying to obtain the copy.

Advance your understanding—enroll for Constitution of India online course to master key constitutional principles.

Case 9: Accused has a right seek a voluntary narco-analysis test to lead evidence

Case Name: Amlesh Kumar v State of Bihar

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Constitution

Art 20(3): Protection against self-incrimination

Art 21: Right to life and personal liberty

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Sec 27: Admissibility of discovered facts

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Sec 439: Bail

Issues:

(i) Whether the High Court correct in accepting the IO’s proposal to conduct narco-analysis tests on all the accused.

(ii) Whether a voluntary narco-analysis test report be used as the sole basis for convicting someone if no other evidence is present.

(iii) Whether an accused person demand to undergo a narco-analysis test as a matter of absolute (indefeasible) right.

Facts:

The case involved Amlesh Kumar (Appellant), who was one of several accused in a criminal matter relating to dowry and the disappearance of his wife.
During the bail proceedings, the Investigating Officer (IO) submitted before the Patna High Court that all accused persons would undergo narco-analysis tests.
The High Court accepted this statement without checking if proper legal procedures, like voluntary consent and judicial oversight, had been followed.
The Appellant approached the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court’s acceptance of the narco-analysis violated his fundamental rights under Articles 20 (3) and 21 of the Constitution and goes against Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010) which declared that narco-analysis and similar tests violate constitutional protections unless conducted voluntarily and under strict safeguards.

Judgment: The Supreme Court said:-

No, the High Court was wrong to accept the submission for conducting narco-analysis on all accused.
No, even if a narco-test is done voluntarily and with safeguards, its report cannot be the sole basis for conviction.
Yes, an accused may voluntarily request a narco-test, but it is not an automatic or absolute right. The court must approve it based on the circumstances.

Case 10: Unregistered sale can’t confer title even if subsequent transaction is registered

Case Name: Mahnoor Fatima Imran v M/S Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt.

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Registration Act, 1908	Sec 17: Documents of which registration is compulsory. Sec 49: Effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered.
Constitution	Art 226: Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act, 1973
Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976

Issues:

(i) Does registration of a sale deed automatically confer legal ownership?

(ii) Can a person claim ownership if the original seller had no valid title?

Facts:

In 1975, 99.07 acres were declared surplus and vested with the State under land reform laws.
In 1982, Bhavana Cooperative Housing Society signed an unregistered sale agreement with GPA holders of the former owners (who had no title by then).
In 2006, the society attempted to “revalidate” the old agreement with altered terms, which was later found fraudulent.
Buyers like Mahnoor Fatima Imran purchased land based on that invalid agreement and got registered sale deeds.
When the Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation moved to redevelop the land, the buyers filed a writ petition under Article 226 to protect possession.
Then the matter reached the Supreme Court.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court dismissed the buyers' claims, holding that:
- A registered sale deed cannot transfer ownership if the seller lacks title.
- The 1982 unregistered agreement and its 2006 revalidation were invalid.
- Writ relief under Article 226 is not available if the petitioner has no lawful title.

Reasons:

Registration ≠ Ownership: Registration is only a notice to the public, not proof of valid title.
Section 49 of the Registration Act makes unregistered agreements inadmissible for property claims.
Land had already vested with the State in 1975, so original owners had no right to sell.

Case 11: Prior approval of Competition Commission of India mandatory u/ IBC

Case Name: Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v Girish Sriram Juneja

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provision:

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Sec 31(4): Approval of resolution plan.

Issues:

(i) Must the approval of CCI for a proposed combination mandatorily precede the approval of the Resolution Plan by CoC under the proviso to Section 31(4) of IBC?

(ii) Did the NCLAT erred in holding that prior CCI approval before CoC approval is only a directory and not mandatory?

(iii) Was the Resolution Plan approved by CoC in favour of AGI Greenpac legally valid despite the alleged lack of statutory approvals at the time of voting?

Facts:

Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. (INSCO) challenged the approval of a Resolution Plan submitted by AGI Greenpac Ltd. to acquire Hindustan National Glass and Industries Ltd. (HNGIL), a major player in the glass packaging industry.
A key issue arose when AGI Greenpac's Resolution Plan was approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) without prior approval from the Competition Commission of India (CCI). INSCO contended that such approval was mandatory under Section 31(4) of the IBC, especially in cases involving combinations under the Competition Act, 2002.
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) ruled that while CCI approval was mandatory, its timing, whether before or after CoC approval, was directory, upholding AGI Greenpac's approval. INSCO challenged this ruling before the Supreme Court.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT judgment, holding that prior approval from the CCI before CoC approval is mandatory, not merely directory. The Court ruled that the statutory framework under the IBC and Competition Act requires compliance with the proviso to Section 31(4) IBC, which mandates obtaining CCI approval before a Resolution Plan involving a combination is put to a vote.

Case 12: Right of senior citizen to claim back their transferred property

Case Name: Urmila Dixit v Sunil Sharan Dixit

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provision:

Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007

Sec 23: Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances.

Issues:

(i) Whether a property transferred by senior citizens by gift or any other medium can be claimed back under Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007

(ii) Whether the authorities under Section 23 of the Act can order eviction from the property and grant possession to the concerned senior citizens.

Facts:

Section 23 of the Act states that if the person who received property fails to care for the giver, the transfer can be cancelled, as if it were obtained by fraud or force.
A Gift Deed was executed by the mother in favour of her son which stated that the son would maintain the mother.
Allegedly, the same day, a vachan patra/promissory note was executed by the son stating that he will take care of the mother and father till the end of their life and if he does not do so, the mother will be at liberty to take back the Gift Deed.
In December 2020, the mother filed an application under Section 23 of the Act before the Sub Divisional Magistrate alleging attacks by the son regarding the further transfer of property.
She sought cancellation of the Deed as there was no love and affection left between the parties. This application was allowed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, and the deed was declared null and void. The son preferred an appeal, which was dismissed by the Collector.
The son then filed a writ petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. A Single-Judge Bench upheld the order of the Collector and dismissed the writ petition.
The son then filed an appeal, and a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the order of the single judge and found the deed valid. Consequently, the mother filed an appeal in the Supreme Court.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Single-Judge Bench of the High Court and cancelled the Gift Deed because the conditions in the gift were not complied with. The Court also ruled that the authorities can order possession to be transferred.

Reasons for the Judgment:

Application of Section 23 of the Act

The Supreme Court, after scrutinising the Gift Deed and Promissory Note, held that the two ingredients necessary for the application of Section 23, as propounded in Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, 2022, i.e., the transfer should have a condition attached to it regarding maintenance and basic needs. The transferee failed to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor.

Case 13: Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits negative discrimination

Case Name: Jyostnamayee Mishra v State of Odisha

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provision:

Constitution

Art 14: Equality before law

Issues:

(i) Can an employee claim promotion to a post meant only for direct recruitment?
(ii) Can a government department fill a direct recruitment post through internal circulars instead of public advertisement?
(iii) Do previous instances of wrongful promotions justify granting similar relief to the petitioner under Article 14 (Right to Equality)?

Facts:

The petitioner was appointed a Peon in 1978. In 1999, she submitted a representation seeking appointment as a tracer. The State responded by informing the petitioner in a letter dated 5 July 1999 that the position of Tracer will be filled by direct recruitment and is not a promotional position.
Despite this, the petitioner claimed discrimination in promotions. The case was moved to the Principal Bench of the Tribunal in Bhubaneshwar, which ordered the State to consider her and other Class-IV employees' applications for promotion to Tracer in the event of future openings.
On January 2016, the Tribunal ordered her appointment as a Tracer and, if no vacancy was available, directed reversion of the last person promoted.
Challenging these orders, the State filed a petition before the Orissa High Court, arguing that the petitioner was ineligible. As the retiral benefits had been extended to the petitioner for the post of Peon, the High Court disposed of the Writ Petition accordingly.
Aggrieved by this decision, she approached the Supreme Court.

Judgment:
The Supreme Court ruled that it would be against the law and fair selection principles for an employee to seek promotion to a position intended only for direct recruitment.

Further, the Supreme Court held that it violates the Constitution and the statutory requirements for a government agency to use internal circulars rather than public advertisements to fill a position intended only for direct recruitment.

For clarity on equal protection before law and judicial interpretations, refer to the explainer on Article 14.

Case 14: Consequence of not informing grounds of arrest

Case Name: Vihaan Kumar v State of Haryana

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Constitution

Art 21: Protection of life and personal liberty
Art 22(1): Rights of arrested

Issues:

(i) Was the Appellant's arrest rendered illegal due to non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Constitution?
(ii) Whether the Appellant's treatment (handcuffing and chaining to a hospital bed) violated his fundamental right to dignity under Article 21.
(iii) Can subsequent legal processes (remand, chargesheet) validate an arrest vitiated by constitutional violations?

Facts:

The Appellant was arrested for offences under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, and 471 read with Section 120-B of the IPC. He filed a writ petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging his arrest as illegal, which was dismissed.
Consequently, he appealed before the Supreme Court.
The Appellant claimed that he was arrested at 10:30 AM on 10 June 2024 and produced before a magistrate on 11 June 2024 at 3:30 PM, alleging a violation of Article 22(2) (failure to produce within 24 hours).
He further contended that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him, breaching Article 22(1). The State, however, asserted that the arrest occurred at 6:00 PM on 10 June 2024, complying with the 24-hour rule, and that the grounds were orally communicated.
The Appellant, after arrest, was hospitalised where he was handcuffed and chained to a hospital bed. Photographic evidence corroborated this treatment, prompting the Supreme Court to issue notices to the hospital and police authorities.
The State later suspended the involved officers and initiated a departmental inquiry.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding the Appellant's arrest illegal due to non-compliance with Article 22(1). The Court ordered the Appellant's immediate release, quashed all subsequent remand orders, and directed the State of Haryana to issue guidelines prohibiting the handcuffing of accused persons in hospitals.

For a detailed breakdown of life and liberty protections, read the dedicated coverage on Article 21 and its evolving jurisprudence.

Case 15: Challenge to the expulsion of a member of the legislature

Case Name: Sunil Kumar Singh v Bihar Legislative Assembly

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provision:

Constitution

Art 212(1): Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature.

Issues:

(i) Whether the Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner is maintainable in view of Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the proceedings of the Ethics Committee are amenable to judicial review.
(ii) Can the Supreme Court exercise its writ jurisdiction to review the proportionality of the punishment imposed by the House?
(iii) If so, whether the Petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate to the misconduct attributed to him and whether it merits any interference?
(iv) Whether the Supreme Court is empowered to determine the quantum of punishment that may be imposed on the Petitioner?

Facts:

The Petitioner, a member of the Rashtriya Janata Dal (“RJD”), filed a Writ Petition to challenge his expulsion from the Bihar Legislative Council (“BLC”).
The Petitioner was alleged of unparliamentary conduct during the Governor's address.
After a formal complaint the BLC Chairman referred the matter to the Ethics Committee for inquiry. The Ethics Committee submitted its report recommending the Petitioner's expulsion.
In July, 2024, the BLC adopted the report, leading to the Petitioner's expulsion.
Subsequently, the BLC Secretariat issued a notification formally relieving the Petitioner of his membership. This expulsion was challenged by the Petitioner in the present case.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court quashed the punishment of expulsion of the Petitioner from the BLC for being disproportionate and excessive. The Court held that the prohibition under Article 212(1) only bars Constitutional Courts from reviewing the legislative proceedings for procedural irregularity. However, it does not prevent the judicial review of the legality or constitutionality of the legislature's actions (both lawmaking and administrative decisions).

Case 16: 7-Tests to determine a member of an unlawful assembly

Case Name: Zainul v State of Bihar

Judgment Copy: Link

Related Provisions:

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC):	Sec 149: Every member of an unlawful assembly is guilty of an offense committed in prosecution of the common object. Sect 141: Defines unlawful assembly. Sect 302: Punishment for murder.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC):	Sect 154: Deals with the mandatory registration of an FIR. Sect 161: Examination of witnesses by police.

Issues:

(i) Whether all the accused could be held liable under Section 149 IPC for the acts of the unlawful assembly.
(ii) Whether the statement of PW-20, recorded hours after the police were already informed, could be legally treated as the FIR under Section 154 CrPC.
(iii) Whether contradictions between ocular and medical evidence affected credibility.

Facts:

The case originated from a violent incident on November 20, 1988, in Katihar, Bihar, over a dispute concerning the possession of agricultural land allotted to them by the Bihar Government under a “Parcha” (settlement).
The prosecution alleged that a mob of 400-500 people from village Mahila, allegedly led by Zainul Sarkar (the sarpanch) and others, attacked the complainant party from village Baharkhal, resulting in the deaths of two individuals (Meghu Mahto and Sarjug Mahto) and injuries to five others.
The FIR was registered based on the statement of an injured eyewitness, Jagdish Mahto (PW-20), initially naming 72 accused.
The Trial Court convicted 21 out of 24 accused persons.
The High Court, in appeal, acquitted 7 convicts, thereby upholding the conviction of 11 accused.
The present appeals were filed by 10 convicted individuals (after two appeals abated due to the death of the appellants) challenging the High Court's judgment.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court acquitted the appellants and held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to:

a. The statement of PW-20 (the recorded FIR) was likely not the first information to the police and was made after deliberations, making it suspicious.
b. The oral testimonies of the injured eyewitnesses (PW-20, PW-3, PW-5, PW-6) were marred by inconsistencies, failed to corroborate each other, and, in some instances, conflicted with the medical evidence (e.g., injuries not matching the weapon alleged).
c. The Court reasoned that mere presence at the scene does not ipso facto render a person a member of the unlawful assembly, unless it is established that such an accused also shared its common object, and a mere bystander, to whom no specific role is attributed, would not fall within the ambit of Section 149 of the IPC.

The Court also laid down 7 tests to determine if the bystander was a member of an unlawful assembly with a common object

the time and place at which the assembly was formed;
the conduct and behaviour of its members at or near the scene of the offence;
the collective conduct of the assembly, as distinct from that of individual members;
the motive underlying the crime;
the manner in which the occurrence unfolded;
the nature of the weapons carried and used;
the nature, extent, and number of the injuries inflicted, and other relevant considerations.

Case 17. Direct recruitment of Judicial Officers as District Judges

Case name: Rejanish K.V. v K Deepa

Judgment Copy: Link

Related Provisions:

The Constitution of India, 1950

Art 233(1): Deals with the appointment of District Judges
Art 233(2): States that "A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment."
Art 14: Equality before Law
Art 16: Equal Opportunity in Public Employment

Issues:

(i) Whether a judicial officer who has already completed 7 years in the Bar, being recruited for subordinate judicial services, would be entitled to appointment as an Additional District Judge against the Bar vacancy.
(ii) Whether the eligibility for appointment as a District Judge is to be seen only at the time of appointment or at the time of application, or both.

Facts:

Rejanish K.V., the appellant, was a practising advocate with over 7 years of experience at the Bar when he applied for appointment as a District Judge through the direct recruitment route reserved for advocates under Article 233(2) of the Constitution.
Before his appointment could be finalised, he was appointed as a Munsiff (Judicial Officer) in the subordinate judiciary.
This raised the key question of whether a judicial officer who had previously practised law could still qualify for appointment as a District Judge under the Bar quota.
Multiple judicial officers in similar positions filed petitions seeking inclusion in the 25% Bar quota.
Their eligibility was denied based on Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020), which required candidates to be practising advocates at the time of application and appointment.
A 3-judge bench referred the matter to a Constitution Bench to decide upon the case.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court held that judicial officers who have previously practised as advocates for at least 7 years are eligible for direct recruitment as district judges under the bar quota. The Court explicitly held that the restrictive interpretations outlined in judgments right from Satya Narain Singh (1985) till Dheeraj Mor (2020) do not lay down the correct proposition of law and were overruled.

It ruled that the expression “a person not already in the service of the Union or the State” in Article 233(2) cannot be interpreted literally to exclude judicial officers who previously practiced as advocates. Additionally, to ensure a level playing field for all streams, the Court mandated a uniform minimum age of 35 years for both advocates and judicial officers as of the date of application.

Case 18. Corporate entities qualify as victims under the CrPC when their rights are infringed.

Case Name: Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu

Judgment Copy: Link

Related Provisions:

Indian Penal Code, 1860	Sec 420: Cheating Sec 120B: Criminal conspiracy Sec 11: Definition of “person”
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973	Sec 2(wa): Definition of victim Sec 372 (Proviso): Victim’s right to appeal against acquittal Sec 374: Appeals from convictions Sec 378: Appeals against acquittal
Copyright Act, 1957	Sec 63: Punishment for infringement of copyright Sec 65: Possession of plates for infringement

Issues:

(i) Whether an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is maintainable against an order passed in an appeal under Section 374 CrPC?

(ii) Can a corporate entity like Asian Paints be considered a “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC, giving it the right to file an appeal against acquittal?

Facts:

Asian Paints Limited, a 73-year-old paint manufacturer, discovered counterfeit paint products in the market that copied its trademark and packaging. The company authorized M/s Solution, an IP consultancy firm, to investigate counterfeiting activities.
On 6 February 2016, an investigator from the firm raided Ganpati Traders, owned by Ram Babu in Rajasthan. The raid recovered 12 counterfeit paint buckets, Fake packaging resembling Asian Paints.
An FIR was registered for offenses under Section 420 IPC, 120B IPC, and Sections 63 & 65 of the Copyright Act. Forensic lab confirmed the paints were counterfeit. The Trial Court convicted the respondent. However, the First Appellate Court acquitted him, citing a lack of sufficient evidence.
Asian Paints approached the High Court under Section 2(wa) read with the proviso to Section 372 CrPC seeking leave to appeal against the acquittal. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the company was not a “victim” within the meaning of Section 2(wa).
Asian Paints approached the Supreme Court, challenging this reasoning.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Rajasthan High Court's order and reaffirming the right of corporate entities to appeal against an acquittal, holding that:

A corporate body, such as Asian Paints Limited, which has suffered financial and reputational loss due to criminal acts like counterfeiting, falls under the statutory definition of a "victim" as per Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
The definition must be read harmoniously with Section 11 IPC, which explicitly includes a company or body of persons within the meaning of “person.”
Such a victim has an independent statutory right to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, irrespective of whether it was the complainant.
Appeals by victims are maintainable even when challenging acquittals passed under Section 374 CrPC. Therefore, The appeal filed by Asian Paints Limited under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is held to be maintainable.
The High Court adopted a narrow view by holding that only the original complainant could appeal. This interpretation is contrary to this Court’s settled position that victim and complainant are distinct concepts.

Precedents used:

Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra (2022): Clarified that the "victim" and "complainant/informant" are two distinct legal connotations. It held that a victim has "unbridled participatory rights" from the stage of investigation till the culmination of proceedings in an appeal or revision.
Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka (2019): The Supreme Court held that a victim’s right to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is independent and does not depend on being the original complainant.

Case 19. Secretly recorded telephonic conversations between spouses are admissible in matrimonial cases.

Case name: Vibhor Garg v. Neha

Judgment Copy: Link

Related Provisions:

Indian Evidence Act, 1872	Sec 122: Communications during marriage
The Constitution of India, 1950	Art. 21: Right to life and personal liberty
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955	Sec 13: Grounds for Divorce
Family Courts Act, 1984	Sec 14: Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Sec 20: Act to have overriding effect.

Issue:

(i) Can secretly recorded phone calls between spouses be used as evidence in divorce cases?

Facts:

A husband filed for divorce in a Family Court in Bathinda, alleging cruelty by his wife.
He submitted a CD of telephonic conversations with his wife, recorded without her knowledge.
The Punjab & Haryana High Court held that the recording violated the wife's privacy and cannot be admitted as evidence.
The husband challenged this order before the Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition (SLP).

Judgment:

Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma set aside the Punjab & Haryana High Court's ruling. Held that secretly recorded telephonic conversations between spouses are admissible in matrimonial cases. There is no breach of privacy under Section 122 in such cases because the law permits disclosure during legal proceedings between spouses.

The Court clarified that this does not amount to a constitutional privacy violation, especially when fair trial rights are at stake. Right to Fair Trial > Privacy in such cases.

Precedents Used:

Deepti Kapur v. Kunal Julka (2020): The Court held that evidence collected in breach of the right to privacy alone would not make it inadmissible in a court of law.
Preeti Jain v. Kunal Jain (2016): The Court upheld the Family Court's order admitting the electronic evidence (video clipping) by emphasizing the Family Courts Act, 1984 (Section 14)

Case 20. High Court cannot interfere in Sec 138 NI Act proceedings unless there is clear abuse of process.

Case name: M/S Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran

Judgment Copy: Link

Related Provisions:

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973	Sec 2(d): Definition of Complaint Sec 2(w): Definition of victim Sec 372: Victim’s right to appeal against acquittal Sec 378: Appeals against acquittal
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881	Sec 138: dishonour of cheque Sec 139: Presumption in favour of holder

Issues:

(i) Whether an appeal against an acquittal in a private complaint case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is maintainable under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC.

(ii) Whether a complainant in a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be considered a "victim" as defined under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC.

(iii) Whether a complainant, if also a victim, can file an appeal against an acquittal without seeking special leave from the High Court under Section 378(4) of the CrPC.

Facts:

M/s. Celestium Financial, a finance firm, filed Section 138 NI Act complaints after the respondents’ cheques bounced, but the Magistrate acquitted them, and the High Court upheld it.
The appellant then approached the Supreme Court under Section 378(4) of the CrPC, invoking the right of a ‘victim’ to seek leave to appeal against acquittal, raising the key question of whether a complainant under Section 138 of the NI Act qualifies as a ‘victim’ under the CrPC.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's common order and allowed the appeals, granting the appellant liberty to file its appeals under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC within 4 months. The Court based its judgment on a liberal and progressive interpretation of the term "victim" under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. It held that a complainant in a Section 138 case, having suffered an economic loss due to a dishonoured cheque, unequivocally fits the definition of a victim.

The Court emphasized that the right of a victim to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 is a substantive right that should not be constrained by the conditions of Section 378(4), which mandates seeking special leave. The Court reasoned that subjecting a victim's appeal to such a condition would be contrary to the legislative intent behind the 2009 amendment, which was to provide a new and unconditional right of appeal to victims.

The 2009 amendment added Section 357A (Victim Compensation Scheme) and Section 2(wa) (definition of 'Victim'), mandating state-funded compensation for victims of crime and formally recognizing them within the legal framework.

Precedents used:

Mallikarjun Kodagali (dead) vs. State of Karnataka: The case affirmed that a victim has the right to file an appeal against an order of acquittal under the proviso to Section 372.

Case 21. Spouse in a void Hindu marriage is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance.

Case name: Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Sec 5: Conditions for a Valid Hindu Marriage
Sec 11: Void Marriages
Sec 24: Maintenance Pendente Lite
Sec 25: Permanent Alimony and Maintenance

Issues:

(i) Can a spouse of a void marriage seek permanent alimony under Section 25?

(ii) Can a spouse seek interim maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 when the marriage is declared void?

(iii) Does the phrase "any decree" under Section 25 include a decree of nullity?

Facts:

The marriage between Sukhdev Singh (Appellant) and Sukhbir Kaur (Respondent) was declared void under Section 11 HMA.
The Respondent-wife sought both interim and permanent maintenance, which the husband contested on the ground that a void marriage confers no spousal rights.
The matter was escalated due to conflicting precedents, leading to a referral to a three-judge bench.

Judgment:

The Supreme court held that a spouse in a void Hindu marriage is entitled to claim permanent alimony under Section 25 and interim maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. A decree of nullity under Section 11 is a "decree" within the meaning of Section 25. Therefore, a spouse in a void marriage can claim permanent alimony.

Similarly, interim maintenance can be granted under Section 24 during proceedings to annul a void marriage. Relief under Sections 24 and 25 is discretionary and depends on facts like financial needs, conduct, and circumstances. The Court criticized earlier usage of terms like "illegitimate wife," calling it undignified and unconstitutional, and reiterated the importance of preserving dignity and avoiding destitution.

Precedents cited:

Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan (1993): Permanent alimony under Section 25 HMA can only be granted when the court passes a substantive decree (divorce, nullity, etc.) under the Act, not when the petition is simply dismissed.
Rameshchandra Daga v. Rameshwari Daga (2005): The term 'any decree' in Section 25 HMA is broadly interpreted to include a decree of nullity, allowing a wife in a marriage declared null and void to claim permanent alimony.

Case 21. Management services from abroad are not taxable in India without a permanent establishment.

Case Name: Hyatt International Southwest Asia Ltd v. Additional Director of Income Tax

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Income Tax Act, 1961	Sec 9(1)(i), 9(1)(vi), 9(1)(vii), Sec 92F(iii-a): Income deemed to arise in India
Indo-UAE Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA)	Art 4: Tax residency Art 5: Permanent Establishment (PE) Art 7: Business profits

Issues:

(i) Whether Hyatt International had a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India under Article 5(1) of the Indo-UAE DTAA.

(ii) Whether income earned under the SOSA was taxable in India as business profits attributable to such PE.

(iii) Whether the absence of exclusive office space or long employee stay precluded the finding of a PE.

Facts:

Hyatt International Southwest Asia Ltd., incorporated in Dubai and a UAE tax resident, entered into Strategic Oversight Services Agreements (SOSA) with Indian hotels to provide consultancy and strategic planning services.
Hyatt claimed it had no fixed place of business in India and thus no taxable presence under the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA). The Revenue, however, held that Hyatt had a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India and taxed income under SOSA accordingly.

Judgment:

Hyatt had a Fixed Place Permanent Establishment (PE) in India under Article 5(1) of the Indo-UAE DTAA. Income earned under the SOSA was attributable to such PE and taxable in India under Article 7.

The Court reiterated that two essential conditions for PE are
- The place must be at the disposal of the enterprise.
- The enterprise must carry on business through that place.

The SOSA gave Hyatt enforceable rights over hotel operations—staffing, financial policies, marketing, procurement, and appointment of the General Manager - amounting to substantive control beyond advisory functions. Exclusive ownership or possession is not essential; even temporary/shared use suffices if business is conducted through such premises (the Formula One case applies).

The Court also clarified that global losses of Hyatt were irrelevant; profit attribution to PE in India is independent of global results. Appeals were dismissed, and the High Court’s decision was upheld.

Precedents cited:

Formula One World Championship Ltd. v. CIT (2017): The Supreme Court broadened the definition of a Fixed Place Permanent Establishment (PE), holding that control and disposal over a physical site for a business of limited duration is sufficient to constitute a PE under a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA).
DIT v. E-Funds IT Solutions Inc. (2018): It was held that a Fixed Place PE is not constituted merely by having an Indian subsidiary that provides back-office services at Arm's Length Price (ALP), unless the foreign entity has the right to use and control the subsidiary's premises.

Case 22. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of arrest powers under the CGST Act and the Customs Act.

Case Name: Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India & Ors

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Customs Act, 1962	Sec 104: Power to arrest in relation to customs offenses.
CGST Act, 2017	Sec 69: Power to arrest in GST matters. Sec 132: Punishment for certain GST offenses.
Constitution of India, 1950	Art. 21: Protection of life and personal liberty. Art. 22: Protection of certain rights in cases of arrest and detention.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973	General procedure for arrest and criminal trials.

Issues:

(i) Whether the arrest powers under Section 69 & Section 132 of the CGST Act and Section 104 of the Customs Act can be exercised without prior FIR and judicial oversight?

(ii) Whether arrest powers violate the protections under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution?

Facts:

The petitioner, Radhika Agarwal, was under investigation by the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) for alleged involvement in generating fake invoices and wrongfully availing Input Tax Credit (ITC) without actual supply of goods or services. In April 2025, GST authorities, invoking powers under Sections 69 and 132 of the CGST Act, 2017, initiated steps to arrest her without filing an FIR under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The petitioner contended that such arrest was arbitrary, violative of Article 21 of the Constitution, and contrary to the procedural safeguards laid down in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997). She also claimed denial of access to legal counsel during interrogation. The Union of India defended the action, asserting that GST evasion is a serious economic offense, the CGST Act provides its own arrest mechanism, and the powers were lawfully exercised.
The matter came before the Supreme Court after the petitioner sought protection against arrest and a declaration that GST officers must follow strict procedural safeguards when exercising arrest powers under the CGST Act.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of arrest powers under the CGST Act and the Customs Act. It ruled that:

The Supreme Court held that these statutes expressly confer powers of arrest under Section 69 of the CGST Act and Section 104 of the Customs Act, making them independent of the FIR requirement under the CRPC, 1973. The Court observed that such powers form part of the statutory scheme to deal with serious economic offenses and are legislatively sanctioned.

The Court held that Parliament has the legislative competence to provide in special laws that arrest may be effected without prior FIR, provided the statute itself clearly grants such power and contains sufficient safeguards. Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution permit lawful restrictions on personal liberty when authorized by valid legislation.

The Court emphasized that the statutory mandate to record “reasons to believe” in writing before arrest is not a mere formality but an important safeguard to ensure that the decision is based on objective satisfaction. This safeguard must be strictly complied with to prevent abuse of power.

Precedents cited:

P.V. Ramana Reddy v. Union of India (2019): Upheld GST arrest powers without prior FIR.
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997): Guidelines on arrest and detention to prevent abuse.
Om Prakash v. Union of India (2011): Held that in the absence of express provision making an offense cognizable, warrantless arrest is not permissible; distinguished in present case.

Case 23. The term "child" under the Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009, includes "orphan children."

Case Name: Poulomi Pavini Shukla v. Union of India

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant provisions:

Constitution of India, 1950	Art. 21: Right to life and personal liberty. Art. 22: Provides safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention. Art. 32: Allows citizens to file a writ petition to enforce their fundamental rights.
RTE Act, 2009	Sec 2(d): Defines a "child belonging to a disadvantaged group." Sec 12(1)(c): Mandates a 25% reservation quota for disadvantaged children in private unaided schools.
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015	Contains the legal definitions for "orphans" and "Children in Need of Care and Protection" (CNCP).

Issues:

(i) Whether the State has failed in its role as parens patriae—the constitutional guardian of citizens unable to protect themselves—by neglecting the rights and welfare of orphans and Children in Need of Care and Protection (CNCP).

(ii) Whether the denial of equality of treatment to orphans, by providing greater benefits and support to children with parents (such as those in OBC and SC/ST categories), amounts to a violation of Article 14 (Right to Equality).

(iii) Whether orphans are entitled to a statutory guarantee of 25% reservation in schools (similar to EWS provisions under the RTE Act, 2009) to ensure their access to quality education.

Facts:

The petitioner, Poulomi Pavini Shukla, is a law graduate, consultant, and author ('Weakest On Earth—Orphans of India) who has been involved with orphanages for over a decade.
In May 2018, she filed a Public Interest Litigation challenging the government's inaction and inadequate support for orphans and "Children in Need of Care and Protection" (CNCP), seeking judicial intervention to protect the Right to Life and Right to Equality of orphaned children.
The petitioner argues that India has over 20 million orphans, as per credible national and international reports, yet the government has no official data or comprehensive schemes for them.

Judgment:

On August 6, 2025, the Supreme Court ruled that the term "child" under the Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009, includes "orphan children" and ordered all states and Union Territories to issue notifications within four weeks to officially include orphaned children as a "disadvantaged group" under Section 2(d) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2009.

This will make orphans eligible for the 25% reservation quota in private unaided schools under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act. The court noted that some states, including Delhi, Gujarat, Sikkim, Meghalaya, and Arunachal Pradesh, have already issued such notifications.

The court also directed states to conduct a survey to identify orphaned children who have either been admitted or denied admission under the RTE Act. It stressed that while the survey is ongoing, states must make simultaneous efforts to ensure deserving orphans are immediately admitted to neighborhood schools if they have been denied admission.

Case 24: Supreme Court Upholds IBC Process; High Court Can’t Stop Personal Guarantor Insolvency

Case Name: Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan & Ors.

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016	Sec 95: Personal insolvency of a corporate debtor’s guarantor
Constitution of India, 1950	Art. 226: High Court writ jurisdiction

Issues:

(i) Whether a High Court can interfere with insolvency proceedings initiated under the IBC.

(ii) Whether the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 can be used to quash insolvency proceedings at the admission stage.

Facts:

Farooq Ali Khan, director of Associate Décor Ltd., had given a personal guarantee for loans the company took from Bank of Baroda and other banks.
After the company defaulted, the Bank invoked the guarantee and demanded ₹244 crores, but Farooq offered only ₹25 crores as full settlement.
The Bank then issued a notice and filed a Section 95 IBC application to start personal insolvency proceedings against him.
NCLT appointed a Resolution Professional, saying objections like limitation or waiver would be examined later in the RP’s report.
Farooq went to the High Court, which stopped the insolvency case, but the Supreme Court restored the NCLT proceedings, holding that the High Court interfered too early.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court set aside the Karnataka High Court order. Directed that the personal insolvency proceedings against Farooq Ali Khan be restored before the NCLT, Bengaluru. Personal guarantees under Section 95 are actionable, and their waiver cannot be presumed without proper adjudication. Intervention at the stage of admission could defeat the purpose of the IBC, which aims at time-bound resolution.

The IBC provides a self-contained mechanism for insolvency proceedings with safeguards. Emphasized that High Courts should not disrupt ongoing IBC proceedings unless there is a clear violation of law or procedure.

Precedents cited:

Dilip B. Jiwrajka v. Union of India, (2024): Appointment of a Resolution Professional under Sections 95–99 of the IBC involves no judicial adjudication, and questions like existence of debt or jurisdictional facts are decided only at the Section 100 stage.
United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010): Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be exercised when an effective statutory remedy exists, especially in financial-recovery matters.

Case 25: Disabled prisoners are entitled to accessible and humane prison conditions.

Case Name: L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu

Judgment Copy: Link

Relevant Provisions:

The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Sec 3: Prohibition of Discrimination Sec 6: Protection and Safety Sec 38: Duties of the State
Constitution of India, 1950	Art. 14: Equality before law Art. 21: Protection of life and personal liberty.

Issues:

(i) Whether the illegal arrest and subsequent denial of proper medical care, nutrition, and accessible facilities to a physically challenged individual amounted to a violation of his fundamental human rights under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

(ii) Whether the lack of a legal framework, infrastructure, and trained personnel in prisons to cater to the needs of persons with disabilities constitutes a systemic failure on the part of the state, in violation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016.

Facts:

The appellant, an advocate with 80% locomotor disability, alleged false criminal charges and arrest in 2020.
He claimed custodial harassment and lack of medical care, proper food, and facilities during incarceration. The prison allegedly failed to meet accessibility requirements under the RPwD Act, 2016, and staff were insensitive to disability needs.
The present appeal was filed against the judgment of the High Court, which ordered Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to the appellant.

Judgment:

The Court issued the following directives:

a. Accessibility & Infrastructure: Make all prison premises wheelchair-friendly with ramps, accessible toilets, and sensory-safe spaces, and provide information in Braille, sign language, and simple language.

b. Healthcare & Therapy: Ensure equal healthcare, on-site/linked physiotherapy, psychotherapy, assistive devices, and nutritious, medically suitable diets for prisoners with disabilities.

c. Audits & Compliance: Conduct accessibility audits within six months, follow up periodically, and fully comply with the RPwD Act, 2017 Rules, and 2021 Guidelines.

Precedents cited:

Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016): Adopted a human-rights-based approach to disability, which influenced the court’s decision to protect the dignity of the disabled.
Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons (2017): Laid the foundation for prison reform; the court expanded this framework to include the specific needs of inmates with disabilities.

Case 26: Liquidated damages & extension of time can co-exist

Case Name: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technology Parks of India

Judgment copy: Link

Related Provisions:

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996	Sec 34: Application for setting aside arbitral award. Sec 37: Appealable orders in arbitral proceedings.
Indian Contract Act, 1872	Sec 55: Effect of failure to perform at a fixed time in contracts where time is essential. Sec 73: Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. Sec 74: Compensation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court erred in reversing the Single Judge’s decision that had set aside the arbitral award under Section 34.
Whether the employer (Software Technology Parks of India) could validly deduct liquidated damages even after extending the contract period.
Whether an arbitral award can be set aside merely because a different interpretation of the contract appears possible to the court.'

Facts:

Software Technology Parks of India (STPI) awarded a construction contract worth ₹16.48 crores to Consolidated Construction Consortium Ltd. (CCCL) for an office-cum-incubation center in Chennai. The project was to be completed by January 15, 2007, but was delayed until November 30, 2007.
STPI imposed liquidated damages of ₹82.43 lakhs under Clause 26 of the contract for the delay. CCCL initiated arbitration, seeking a refund of the deducted amount, contending that STPI had extended time without reserving the right to impose damages.
The arbitrator rejected CCCL’s claims, upholding the deduction. The Single Judge of the Madras High Court (under Section 34) set aside the award, holding that once time was extended, liquidated damages could not be levied.
The Division Bench, in appeal under Section 37, reinstated the arbitral award, emphasizing that the Single Judge exceeded the limited scope of judicial review. CCCL appealed to the Supreme Court of India.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the arbitral award, affirming the Division Bench’s decision.

Courts exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot function as appellate bodies to re-evaluate evidence or reinterpret contractual clauses. The Court reiterated that the scope of judicial interference is confined to instances of patent illegality or perversity. The Single Judge, therefore, erred by substituting the arbitrator’s interpretation with his own.
The arbitrator’s conclusion that liquidated damages were validly deducted under Clause 26 was considered plausible and legally sustainable, as the time extensions were expressly granted “without prejudice” to the employer’s right to recover damages.
The Court emphasized that merely extending the time for performance does not automatically waive the employer’s right to levy liquidated damages unless the contract explicitly provides for such waiver.

The Court referred to Section 55, which states that when a party promises to perform an act within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract (or its unperformed portion) becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if time is of the essence. However, if time is not of the essence, the contract does not become voidable; instead, the promisee is entitled to claim compensation for losses caused by the delay. Further, if the promisee accepts delayed performance without reserving the right to claim damages at that time, compensation cannot later be demanded unless notice of intention to do so is given at the time of acceptance.

Sections 73 and 74 deal with the consequences of breach of contract. Under Section 73, the aggrieved party is entitled to compensation for any loss or damage that naturally arises from the breach or that the parties could foresee at the time of contracting. Section 74, on the other hand, governs cases where a sum or penalty is stipulated in advance for breach. It allows the aggrieved party to claim reasonable compensation, not exceeding the amount named, even if actual loss is not proved, provided the breach is established.

In this context, the Court held that the arbitral award correctly applied Sections 55, 73, and 74, since the contract expressly stipulated liquidated damages for delay, and the employer’s right to claim them was preserved under Clause 26. The arbitrator’s interpretation thus aligned with established contractual principles.

Case 27: Bars ex-post facto environmental clearances

Case name: Vanashakti v Union of India

Judgment copy: Link

Related Provisions:

The Constitution of India, 1950	Art. 21: Right to life and personal liberty Art 48A: Duty of the State to protect and improve the environment. Art 51A(g): Fundamental duty of every citizen to protect the natural environment.
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986	Sec 3(1): Power of Central Government to take measures for protecting and improving the environment. Sec 3(2)(v): Restriction on industries or processes in certain areas. Sec 5: Power to issue directions.
Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986	Rule 5: Procedure for prohibition and restriction on location of industries.

Issues:

Whether the 2021 Office Memorandum issued by MoEFCC allowing post facto environmental clearances violates the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the EIA Notification, 2006.
Whether such clearance infringes the right to life and a clean environment guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Whether the concept of “development” can justify environmental degradation in violation of statutory and constitutional obligations.

Facts:

The petition was filed by Vanashakti, a non-governmental environmental organization, challenging the 2021 Office Memorandum (OM) issued by the MoEFCC.
The 2021 OM allowed project proponents who had carried out construction, expansion, or operation of projects without prior Environmental Clearance (EC) under the EIA Notification, 2006, to apply for post facto environmental clearance.
The petitioners contended that this effectively legitimized illegal constructions and environmental violations, violating citizens’ fundamental right to a healthy environment under Article 21.
The Union Government defended the OM, arguing it provided a mechanism for regularization and assessment of projects already in operation, preventing abrupt closure and loss of investment.
The Court was asked to determine whether post facto environmental clearance is permissible under Indian environmental law.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court struck down the Office Memorandum dated 7 July 2021 issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC), holding it unconstitutional and ultra vires the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the EIA Notification, 2006.
The Court declared that post facto environmental clearances are impermissible, as they defeat the very purpose of environmental impact assessment, which is a preventive mechanism. Granting clearance after damage has occurred violates both the statute and constitutional principles.
The Bench held that permitting such retrospective regularization violates Article 21 of the Constitution—the right to life, which includes the right to a clean and healthy environment. Any administrative measure allowing environmental degradation infringes this fundamental right.
The Court criticized the 2021 OM for protecting project proponents who willfully violated the law by proceeding without Environmental Clearance. It held that such actions display “scant respect for the law” and that offenders must face penal and remedial consequences under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.
Reiterating the principles from Alembic Pharmaceuticals and Common Cause, the Court emphasized that development cannot come at the cost of environmental destruction. It reaffirmed the doctrines of sustainable development, the precautionary principle, and polluter pays, directing authorities to ensure strict compliance with environmental safeguards.

Precedents cited:

Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati & Ors., (2020): Post facto approvals are contrary to environmental law.
Common Cause v. Union of India, (2017): Illegal mining and violations of environmental norms cannot be retrospectively regularized.

Case 28: Laundry business, including dry cleaning, covered by ‘Manufacturing Process’

Case name: The State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi

Judgment copy: Link

Related Provisions:

Factories Act, 1948:	Sec 2(k): Definition of “manufacturing process.” Sec 2(m): Definition of “factory.” Sec 6: Approval, licensing, and registration of factories. Sec 92: General penalty for offenses.
Goa Factories Rules, 1985:	Rule 3: Approval of factory plans. Rule 4: Licensing of factories. Rule 6: Procedure for registration and license renewal.
Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948:	Sec 2(14AA): Definition of “manufacturing process.”

Issues:

Whether the process of washing and dry cleaning clothes constitutes a “manufacturing process” under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948.
Whether the premises where such activity is carried out with the aid of power and employing more than 10 workers qualifies as a “factory” under Section 2(m).
Whether the High Court erred in quashing the criminal proceedings for non-compliance with factory licensing requirements.

Facts:

The respondent operated a professional laundry service, “White Cloud,” with six collection centers across Goa and one central processing unit employing more than nine workers.
Upon inspection (20 May 2019), authorities found that the laundry was functioning without an approved plan, registration, or factory license, violating provisions of the Factories Act and Goa Factories Rules.
The respondent argued that laundry services did not constitute a “manufacturing process,” claiming their activity was purely service-based and registered under the Shops and Establishments Act.
The Judicial Magistrate (JMFC), Panaji, issued a process under Section 92 of the Factories Act.
The High Court of Bombay at Goa quashed the summons, holding that “dry cleaning” does not amount to a manufacturing process, as it does not produce a new, marketable product.
The State of Goa appealed to the Supreme Court.

Judgment:

The Court held that activities such as washing, cleaning, and dry cleaning fall squarely within the definition of “manufacturing process” under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948, as they are performed with a view to the use, delivery, or disposal of articles. Since the respondent’s laundry used power-driven machines and employed more than ten workers, the establishment met the statutory definition of a “factory” under Section 2(m).

The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s finding that dry cleaning does not create a new product. The Court clarified that transformation or saleability is not essential for an activity to be a manufacturing process under the Act. Emphasizing that the Factories Act is beneficial welfare legislation, the Court ruled that its provisions must be interpreted broadly to protect workers’ safety and welfare, not narrowly to exclude such establishments.

The Court set aside the High Court’s order quashing the criminal complaint and restored proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate, holding that operating a laundry without a valid factory license constituted a violation of the Factories Act, 1948.

Precedents cited:

Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd. (2014): The Supreme Court referred to this case to emphasize that the interpretation of welfare legislation such as the Factories Act must be liberal and purposive, not narrow or restrictive.
S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat (2001): This precedent clarified that the Factories Act applies to all premises where a manufacturing process is carried on with the aid of power and with a sufficient number of workers, irrespective of whether goods are manufactured for sale.

Case 29: Bars criminal courts from reviewing or altering their judgments

Case name: Vikram Bakshi v. RP Khosla

Judgment copy: Link

Related Provisions:

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC):	Sec 340: Procedure in cases regarding offenses affecting administration of justice. Sec 362: Court not to alter or review its judgment. Sec 482: Saving of inherent powers of High Court.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC):	Order XLVII: Review.

Issues:

Whether a criminal court can review or recall its own order in proceedings initiated under Section 340 CrPC.
Whether the High Court’s power under Section 482 CrPC or Order XLVII CPC can override the statutory bar under Section 362 CrPC.
Whether proceedings under Section 340 CrPC are criminal in nature and governed by CrPC procedure.

Facts:

The dispute arose between Vikram Bakshi (appellant) and R.P. Khosla (respondent) over the affairs of Montreaux Resorts Pvt. Ltd. (MRPL), a joint venture company.
The respondent (Khosla) filed a petition under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), before the Delhi High Court, alleging that forged and fabricated minutes of the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of MRPL had been produced before the Company Law Board (CLB), amounting to perjury and offenses under Sections 191, 192, and 193 of the IPC.
The Delhi High Court, by an earlier order, had dismissed the Section 340 petition, observing that the Company Law Board (later NCLT) was the appropriate forum to examine the allegations.
Later, the respondent filed a review petition under Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) before the same High Court, arguing that new facts had emerged—particularly, that the company petition before the NCLT had been withdrawn, which removed the basis of the earlier dismissal.
The Delhi High Court allowed the review petition, recalled its earlier order, and revived the Section 340 proceedings.
The appellant challenged this before the Supreme Court

Judgment:

The Court held that once a judgment or final order is signed, a criminal court becomes functus officio. It cannot alter or review its decision except for clerical or arithmetical errors, unless explicitly authorized by law.
A criminal court may recall an order only in exceptional situations—such as lack of jurisdiction, fraud on the court, a mistake causing prejudice, or when a necessary party was not served. These are limited to procedural review, not substantive review.
Proceedings under Section 340 CrPC are criminal in nature, as they relate to offenses like perjury. Therefore, CPC provisions, including Order XLVII, cannot apply.
The Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in entertaining the review petition under CPC and recalling its own judgment. Withdrawal of the company petition before NCLT was not a valid ground since the High Court’s earlier decision rested on broader principles of jurisdiction and the binding directions of the Supreme Court in 2014.
The Court reiterated, “A careful consideration of Section 362 CrPC and precedents clarifies that criminal courts are barred from altering or reviewing their own judgments, except for clerical or arithmetical errors or when permitted by statute. The bar is to be applied stricto sensu.”
Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order dated 05.05.2021 of the Delhi High Court was set aside, and the original judgment dated 13.08.2020 was restored.

Precedents cited:

State of Kerala v. M.M. Manikantan Nair (2001)—Cited to establish that once a criminal court has signed its judgment or final order, it becomes functus officio and cannot revisit, modify, or review that judgment.
Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa (2001) – Relied upon to clarify that no power of review exists under the CrPC, and the court cannot alter or review its judgment once pronounced, except for clerical corrections.
Sanjeev Kapoor v. Chandana Kapoor (2020)— Quoted to reaffirm that Section 362 CrPC operates as a complete bar to review or modification of criminal judgments, even by invoking inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.

Case 30: Clarifies the scope of Sec 387 IPC

Case name: Balaji Traders v. State of UP

Judgment copy: Link

Related Provisions:

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)

Sec 383 – Definition of extortion.
Sec 384 – Punishment for extortion.
Sec 385 – Putting a person in fear of injury in order to commit extortion.
Sec 386 – Extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt.
Sec 387 – Putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt in order to commit extortion.
Sec 388 – Extortion by threat of accusation of an offense.
Sec 389 – Putting a person in fear of accusation in order to commit extortion.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)

Sec 200 – Examination of complainant.
Sec 482 – Inherent powers of High Court.

Issues:

Whether the offense of extortion under Section 387 IPC requires the actual delivery of property or whether merely putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt with the intent to commit extortion is sufficient.
Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC when the complaint and evidence prima facie disclosed an offense under Section 387 IPC.

Facts:

The complainant, Prof. Manoj Kumar Agrawal, proprietor of M/s. Balaji Traders, ran a betel nut business. The accused, Sanjay Gupta, began a business under the same name, leading to trademark and copyright disputes.
On 22 May 2022, the accused, along with armed associates, allegedly stopped and threatened the complainant to shut his business or pay ₹5 lakh monthly. Upon refusal, the complainant was assaulted, and an attempt was made to kidnap him.
When the police refused to register an FIR, he filed a complaint under Section 200 CrPC. The Trial Court found a prima facie case under Section 387 IPC (putting a person in fear of death to commit extortion) and issued summons.
The High Court quashed the proceedings, holding that since no money was delivered, extortion under Section 383 IPC was incomplete.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court held that Section 387 IPC criminalizes the act of putting or attempting to put any person in fear of death or grievous hurt in order to commit extortion, even if no property is delivered. The provision covers the process of committing extortion, not merely its completion. The Court held that the offense under Section 387 IPC is distinct from Section 384 IPC, as the former deals with acts preparatory to extortion. It clarified that delivery of property is not a sine qua non for the offense under Section 387 IPC.

The Bench found that the High Court’s reasoning was legally flawed, as it had incorrectly assumed that the absence of actual extortion negated liability under Section 387 IPC. The High Court wrongly conflated the requirements of Sections 383 and 384 with those of Section 387. The Supreme Court stated that when the Legislature creates two separate offenses with distinct ingredients, the court cannot import the requirements of one into the other. It emphasized that putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt is, by itself, sufficient to attract Section 387 IPC.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed; the High Court’s judgment dated 28 June 2024 was set aside, and Complaint Case No. 58 of 2022 was restored to the Trial Court’s file. Both parties were directed to appear before the Trial Court on 12 August 2025, and the hearing was ordered to be expedited.

Precedents cited:

R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1986)—Defined ingredients of extortion under Section 383 IPC.
Radha Ballabh v. State of U.P. (1995)– Demand of ransom without delivery still constitutes a Section 387 offense.
Somasundaram v. State (2020)—Conviction upheld under Section 387 IPC even without delivery of property.

Case 31: Reduction of share capital amounts to transfer of capital assets

Case name: Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Jupiter Capital Pvt Ltd.

Judgment copy: Link

Related Provisions:

Income Tax Act, 1961:	Sec 2(47)—Definition of “transfer” in relation to a capital asset. Sec 45 – Capital gains chargeable to tax. Sec 48 – Mode of computation of capital gains.
Companies Act, 2013:	Sec 66 – Reduction of share capital.

Issues:

Whether reduction of share capital under Section 66 of the Companies Act constitutes a “transfer” under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act.
Whether extinguishment of shareholder rights upon capital reduction gives rise to a taxable event for capital gains.
Whether maintaining the same shareholding ratio precludes recognition of capital loss.

Facts:

Jupiter Capital Pvt. Ltd. invested in Asianet News Network Pvt. Ltd., acquiring about 99.88% of its equity shares. Due to heavy financial losses, Asianet sought approval from the Bombay High Court for reduction of share capital from over 15.35 crore shares to 10,000 shares, keeping the face value of ₹10 unchanged.
The High Court approved the reduction, directing payment of ₹3.17 crore to Jupiter Capital. Jupiter Capital claimed a long-term capital loss from this reduction.
The Assessing Officer (AO) and CIT(A) disallowed the claim, holding there was no “transfer” since the shareholding percentage remained the same. The ITAT reversed this, holding that reduction of capital results in extinguishment of shareholder rights, amounting to transfer under Section 2(47).
The Karnataka High Court affirmed ITAT’s decision. The Revenue appealed to the Supreme Court.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court dismissed the Revenue’s appeal, affirming that reduction in share capital constitutes a “transfer” within the meaning of Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court held that even if the shareholder’s proportionate ownership remains unchanged, extinguishment of a portion of rights—such as entitlement to dividends and liquidation proceeds—amounts to a relinquishment of rights and therefore a transfer.

It clarified that a company’s reduction of share capital under Section 66 of the Companies Act is a recognized mode of altering shareholder rights, and when such reduction occurs, the right to dividend and participation in assets is extinguished to the extent of the reduction. The Court emphasized that Section 2(47) is an inclusive provision, covering relinquishment or extinguishment of any rights in a capital asset, not limited to actual sale or transfer.

Consequently, the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed, affirming the decisions of the ITAT and Karnataka High Court and upholding the assessee’s right to claim capital loss arising from extinguishment of shareholder rights.

Precedents cited:

Kartikeya V. Sarabhai v. CIT (1997)—Reduction of capital constitutes extinguishment of shareholder rights and amounts to transfer.
Anarkali Sarabhai v. CIT (1997)—Redemption or reduction of shares is a form of sale, covered under “transfer.”

CIT v. Jaykrishna Harivallabhdas (1998)— Consideration is not mandatory to compute capital gains; extinguishment itself is a transfer.

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Top 30 Supreme Court Judgments of 2025 for AILET PG 2026

Case 1: Court’s power to modify an arbitral award

Case Name: Gayatri Balasamy v M/s ISG Novasoft

Case 2: 3 years of practice must for Civil Judge (Jr. Division) eligibility

Case Name: All India Judges Association v Union of India

Case 3: Using an additional language apart from the official language of the state is permissible

Case Name: Varshatai v State of Maharashtra

Case 4: Posting a poem promoting sacrifice & non-violence does not attract offences under BNS

Case Name: Imran Pratapgarhi v State of Gujarat

Case 5: Timelines for Governors & the President on State Bills

Case Name: State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu

Case 6: Validity of exclusive jurisdiction clauses under Sec 28 of Contract Act ​

Case Name: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd & HDFC Bank v Deepti Bhatia

Case 7: Reconsidering Senior Advocate designation criteria

Case Name: Jitender @ Kalla v State (NCT of Delhi)

Case 8: Limitation period in commercial appeals begins on pronouncement

Case Name: Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd v M/s. Heavy Electricals Limited

Case 9: Accused has a right seek a voluntary narco-analysis test to lead evidence

Case Name: Amlesh Kumar v State of Bihar

Case 10: Unregistered sale can’t confer title even if subsequent transaction is registered

Case Name: Mahnoor Fatima Imran v M/S Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt.

Case 11: Prior approval of Competition Commission of India mandatory u/ IBC

Case Name: Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v Girish Sriram Juneja

Case 12: Right of senior citizen to claim back their transferred property

Case Name: Urmila Dixit v Sunil Sharan Dixit

Case 13: Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits negative discrimination

Case Name: Jyostnamayee Mishra v State of Odisha

Case 14: Consequence of not informing grounds of arrest

Case Name: Vihaan Kumar v State of Haryana

Case 15: Challenge to the expulsion of a member of the legislature

Case Name: Sunil Kumar Singh v Bihar Legislative Assembly

Case 16: 7-Tests to determine a member of an unlawful assembly

Case Name: Zainul v State of Bihar

Case 17. Direct recruitment of Judicial Officers as District Judges

Case name: Rejanish K.V. v K Deepa

Case 18. Corporate entities qualify as victims under the CrPC when their rights are infringed.

Case Name: Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu

Case 19. Secretly recorded telephonic conversations between spouses are admissible in matrimonial cases.

Case name: Vibhor Garg v. Neha

Case 20. High Court cannot interfere in Sec 138 NI Act proceedings unless there is clear abuse of process.

Case name: M/S Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran

Case 21. Spouse in a void Hindu marriage is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance.

Case name: Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur

Case 21. Management services from abroad are not taxable in India without a permanent establishment.

Case Name: Hyatt International Southwest Asia Ltd v. Additional Director of Income Tax

Case 22. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of arrest powers under the CGST Act and the Customs Act.

Case Name: Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India & Ors

Case 23. The term "child" under the Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009, includes "orphan children."

Case Name: Poulomi Pavini Shukla v. Union of India

Case 24: Supreme Court Upholds IBC Process; High Court Can’t Stop Personal Guarantor Insolvency

Case Name: Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan & Ors.

Case 25: Disabled prisoners are entitled to accessible and humane prison conditions.

Case Name: L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu

Case 26: Liquidated damages & extension of time can co-exist

Case Name: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technology Parks of India

Case 27: Bars ex-post facto environmental clearances

Case name: Vanashakti v Union of India

Case 28: Laundry business, including dry cleaning, covered by ‘Manufacturing Process’

Case name: The State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi

Case 29: Bars criminal courts from reviewing or altering their judgments

Case name: Vikram Bakshi v. RP Khosla

Case 30: Clarifies the scope of Sec 387 IPC

Case name: Balaji Traders v. State of UP

Case 31: Reduction of share capital amounts to transfer of capital assets

Case name: Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Jupiter Capital Pvt Ltd.

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Top 10 Current Affairs October 2025

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Case 6: Validity of exclusive jurisdiction clauses under Sec 28 of Contract Act