Top 15 Supreme Court Judgments of 2025 for CLAT PG 2026

Preparing for CLAT PG 2026? Then you can’t afford to miss the most important Supreme Court judgments delivered in 2025!

Whether it's the constitutional validity of arrest powers, the rights of senior citizens, or the latest developments in arbitration, family law, and criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has delivered significant rulings this year.

In this power-packed blog, we’ve curated the Top 15 landmark judgments of 2025, simplified and carefully selected for their relevance to CLAT PG 2026. Bookmark it for your revision sprint!

Case 1: Court’s power to modify an arbitral award

Case Name: Gayatri Balasamy v M/s ISG Novasoft

Relevant Provisions:

Issue: 

(i) Whether Indian courts possess the authority to modify arbitral awards under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, specifically under Sections 34 and 37.

Facts:

• Ms. Gayatri Balasamy was appointed as Vice President at ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. She tendered her resignation, alleging sexual harassment by the CEO.
• Her resignation was not accepted, and over the next year, she received three termination letters. Ms. Balasamy filed criminal complaints against the CEO and Vice-President for offenses under the IPC and the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act.
• ISG Novasoft filed counter-complaints alleging defamation and extortion.
• The Supreme Court referred the dispute to arbitration and the arbitral tribunal awarded Ms. Balasamy Rs 2 crore.
• Madras High Court (single-judge bench) modified the award, granting an additional Rs. 1.6 crore.
• Subsequently, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court reduced this additional amount to Rs 50,000.
• Ms. Balasamy filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court challenging the division bench's decision.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, held that courts possess a limited power under Sections 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act to modify an arbitral award.

Majority Opinion:

• Severability: If an award contains distinct parts, and one part is invalid, courts can sever the invalid portion and uphold the valid part.

• Correction of Errors: Courts can correct clerical, typographical, or computational errors apparent on the face of the award.

• Modification of Post-Award Interest: Under Section 31(7) (b), courts can modify the rate or period of post-award interest if it is found to be exorbitant or contrary to law.

• Invocation of Article 142: In exceptional cases, the Supreme Court can invoke Article 142 to modify an arbitral award to ensure complete justice.

• Distinction from Appellate Power: The power to modify is not akin to appellate jurisdiction.

Dissenting Opinion (Justice K.V. Viswanathan): Sections 34 and 37 do not grant courts the power to modify arbitral awards. The Act, unlike its 1940 predecessor, consciously omits any provision for modification, indicating legislative intent to limit judicial intervention.

• Allowing modification would blur the lines between setting aside an award and appellate review, which is not permissible under the Act.

• The power under Article 142 should not be used to circumvent statutory limitations.

Case 2: 3 years of practice must for Civil Judge (Jr. Division) eligibility

Case Name: All India Judges Association v Union of India

Relevant Provisions:

Issues:

(i) Whether the requirement of having a minimum of three years' practice for appearing in the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination, which was previously done away with, needs to be restored.

(ii) If restored, whether the practice period should be calculated from the date of provisional enrollment/registration or from the date of passing the All India Bar Examination (AIBE).

Facts:

• This case is a continuation of the long-standing "All India Judges Association" litigation (1989), dealing with judicial service conditions and entry qualifications. 

• In 2002 (Third AIJA Case), the Supreme Court had removed the mandatory 3-year practice rule for fresh law graduates entering judicial service. 

• However, based on observations from various High Courts regarding issues with inexperienced judges, the Court revisited this decision in the current case.

Petitioner's Arguments: 

• Most High Courts, in their affidavits, agreed that the minimum three years' experience at the Bar for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination needs to be restored. Reasons cited included:
• Lack of practical experience leading to difficulties in handling procedural issues, court proceedings, and urgent orders.
• Behavioural and temperamental problems observed in fresh law graduates.
• The belief that actual practicing experience is "invaluable and irreplaceable.'
• Practical exposure acquaints judges with the duties of all stakeholders and brings sensitivity to human problems.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court decided to restore the requirement of prior practice for Civil Judge (Junior Division) and issued the following directions:

• Mandatory 3-year practice: Candidates for Civil Judge (Junior Division) must have practised for a minimum period of 3 years to be eligible for the examination.

• Calculation of practice: The 3-year practice period will be calculated from the date of their provisional enrollment/registration with the concerned State Bar Council.

• Proof of practice: Candidates must produce a certificate from an advocate with a minimum standing of 10 years, duly endorsed by the Principal Judicial Officer of the District/station (for Mofussil courts) or an officer designated by the High Court/Supreme Court (for High Court/Supreme Court practice).

• Law Clerk Experience: Experience gained as Law Clerks with Judges or Judicial Officers will also be considered.

• Prospective Application: This requirement will not affect selection processes already initiated before the judgment date but will apply from the next recruitment process.

Case 3: Using an additional language apart from the official language of the state is permissible

Case Name: Varshatai v State of Maharashtra

Relevant Provisions: 

Issue:

(i) Whether the High Court of Bombay was correct in concluding that the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022, does not prohibit the use of Urdu as an additional language on the signboard of a Municipal Council building in Maharashtra.

Facts:

• A signboard of the new building of the Municipal Council in Maharashtra displayed the text "Municipal Council, Patur", in Marathi at the top, followed by its Urdu translation. 

• The appellant objected to the use of Urdu, contending that since Marathi was the official language of the State of Maharashtra, the work of the Municipal Council could only be conducted in Marathi. 

• Therefore, the use of Urdu in any manner was impermissible. The Municipal Council rejected these objections. 

• The appeal reached the High Court, which did not consider it a case calling for interference. Aggrieved, the appellant challenged the High Court's order before the Supreme Court.

• During the appeal's pendency, the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022, was enacted. The appellant contended that under Section 3 of the 2022 Act, the use of Urdu on the Municipal Councils' signboard could not be permitted.

Judgment:

The Division Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, holding that there was no prohibition on the use of Urdu under the 2022 Act.

Looking for broader monthly legal updates after these major rulings? Check out the July 2025 legal current affairs roundup.

Case 4: Posting a poem promoting sacrifice & non-violence does not attract offences under BNS

Case Name: Imran Pratapgarhi v State of Gujarat

Relevant Provisions: 

Issues:

(i) Whether the recitation and posting of a poem by the appellant constituted offences under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

(il) Whether registration of the FIR violated the Appellant’s fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Facts:

• The Appellant, a Member of the Rajya Sabha, had posted a video clip from a mass marriage ceremony at which a poem was recited. 

• The poem, in Urdu, metaphorically spoke of facing injustice with love and sacrificing personal losses for truth. 

• A complaint alleged that the poem incited enmity between communities, promoted hatred, and harmed national unity. 

• FIR was registered under Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57, and 3(5) of the BNS.

• When the High Court dismissed the appellant's petition seeking the quashing of the FIR he approached the Supreme Court.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the FIR, and held that registration of the FIR regarding the posted poem was a mechanical exercise without application of mind. This amounted to a clear abuse of the process of law and violated the fundamental right of the appellant under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution.

Need a sharper view of constitutional freedoms under Article 19? Follow the detailed write‑up on Article 19 of the Indian Constitution for precise insights.

Master the Indian Penal Code essentials for your law exams. Enrol now and build a rock-solid foundation – all in one place.

Case 5: Timelines for Governors & the President on State Bills

Case Name: State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu

Relevant Provisions:

Issue: 

(i) Whether the Governor of Tamil Nadu's prolonged inaction on 12 bills passed by the state legislature was constitutional.

Facts:

• Between January 2020 and April 2023, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed 12 bills, most of them were about amending university laws.

• These bills were duly forwarded to the Governor for assent, as mandated by Article 200 of the Constitution.

• The Governor withheld assent on 10 bills and reserved 2 for the President's consideration, without providing timely responses.

• The state government contended that this inaction was unconstitutional and impeded the state's legislative process.

Judgment:

a. Governor's Delay is Unconstitutional: Governor's prolonged inaction on the bills was "illegal and erroneous," violating the constitutional mandate.

b. Deemed Assent via Article 142: Invoking its powers under Article 142, the Court deemed the 10 bills, which were pending assent and those reserved for the President.

c. Timelines for Governor's Actions: The Court established specific timelines to ensure prompt action:

• Withholding Assent or Reserving for President: Must be done within one month.

• Returning a Bill for Reconsideration: If the Governor withholds assent against the advice of the Council of Ministers, the bill must be returned within three months.

• Assenting to Re-passed Bills: Upon receiving a re-passed bill, the Governor must grant assent within one month.

d. No Absolute Veto Power: Governor does not possess an absolute veto under Article 200. Once a bill is re-passed by the legislature after being returned, the Governor is constitutionally obligated to grant assent.

e. Expansion of Judicial Review: Allowing courts to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Governor to perform constitutional duties when necessary.

To grasp safeguards against retrospective punishment, refer to the focused guide on Article 20 of the Constitution.

Case 6: Validity of exclusive jurisdiction clauses under Sec 28 of Contract Act ​

Case Name: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd & HDFC Bank v Deepti Bhatia

Relevant Provisions: 

Issues:

(i) Whether exclusive jurisdiction clauses in employment contracts are barred by Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act.

(ii) Whether such clauses are enforceable in employment contracts, especially where there is unequal bargaining power?

(iii) Whether the Mumbai courts had proper jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC?

Facts:

• Two employees of HDFC Bank Ltd., Rakesh Kumar Verma and Deepti Bhatia, were terminated from service.

• Both challenged their terminations by filing suits in Patna and Delhi respectively, despite their employment contracts specifying exclusive jurisdiction of Mumbai courts.

• HDFC Bank invoked the jurisdiction clause and sought rejection of the plaints under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

• The Patna High Court upheld the jurisdiction clause and dismissed Rakesh’s plaint.

• The Delhi High Court, however, rejected the clause and allowed Deepti’s suit to proceed.

• Both orders were appealed before the Supreme Court. So, here are two cases- Rakesh Kumar Verma v. HDFC Bank Ltd. & HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Deepti Bhatia.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the HDFC Bank, affirming the validity of the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in both employment contracts. It held that the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in this case did not violate Section 28 of the Contract Act, the Mumbai courts had jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC, these clauses were agreed between the parties and the language of the clauses was clear and exclusive. 

Therefore, the suits filed in Patna and Delhi were not maintainable, and the proper forum for adjudication was the courts in Mumbai, as agreed upon by the parties.

Want a comprehensive list of seminal constitutional judgments beyond 2025? Visit Top Landmark Judgments for a curated study.

Case 7: Reconsidering Senior Advocate designation criteria

Case Name: Jitender @ Kalla v State (NCT of Delhi) 

Relevant Provisions:

Issues:

(i) Whether the criteria for designating Senior Advocates, especially length of practice, are rational and justifiable.

(ii) Whether the practice of different gowns for Senior Advocates has any legal basis under the Advocates Act.

Facts:

• The case arose from a criminal appeal in which broader concerns about the designation process of Senior Advocates were raised.

• A two-Judge Bench had earlier expressed doubts regarding the system established in Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India (2017) for Senior Advocate designation.

• These concerns were placed before a three-Judge Bench by administrative order of the Chief Justice of India for deeper examination.

Judgment:

1. On Criteria for Senior Designation:

• The Court held that standing at the Bar must be assessed based on qualities, not just years of experience.

• Length of practice alone is not a rational criterion—someone may practice for years with minimal court engagement.

• The Court emphasised a holistic evaluation of: Integrity, Fairness in Court, Respect for Judges & Peers, Mentorship, Pro bono work, Professional ethics, Ability and specialized legal knowledge.

2. On Senior Gown Practice: The Court observed that different gowns for Senior Advocates have no basis in the Advocates Act. It left the decision to discontinue this practice to the respective High Courts while framing rules.

Case 8: Limitation period in commercial appeals begins on pronouncement

Case Name: Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd v M/s. Heavy Electricals Limited

Relevant Provisions:

Issues:

(i) Whether the limitation period for filing an appeal under the Commercial Courts Act begins from the date of pronouncement or the date of receipt of the judgment copy.

(ii) Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

(iii) Whether the provisions of Order XX Rule 1(1) CPC are mandatory in nature, such that limitation would start only after the judgment is served to the parties.

Facts:

• The respondent, a Central Government company, had filed a civil suit against the appellants to recover over ₹26 crores with interest, based on an award from the MSME Council, Kanpur. 

• The Commercial Court, Ranchi, passed a judgment on the matter. 

• The appellants filed a statutory appeal 301 days late and applied for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which the Jharkhand High Court rejected for lack of "sufficient cause."

• The appellants contended that the limitation period should commence only from the receipt of the certified copy of the judgment, relying on the language of Order XX Rule 1 CPC, which mandates courts to issue copies of judgments to parties.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the limitation period begins from the date of pronouncement of the judgment and not from the date of receipt of its certified copy, unless the litigant shows diligence in trying to obtain the copy.

Advance your understanding—enroll for Constitution of India Part 1 online course to master key constitutional principles.

Case 9: Accused has a right seek a voluntary narco-analysis test to lead evidence

Case Name: Amlesh Kumar v State of Bihar

Relevant Provisions: 

Issues:

(i) Whether the High Court correct in accepting the IO’s proposal to conduct narco-analysis tests on all the accused.

(ii) Whether a voluntary narco-analysis test report be used as the sole basis for convicting someone if no other evidence is present.

(iii) Whether an accused person demand to undergo a narco-analysis test as a matter of absolute (indefeasible) right.

Facts: 

• The case involved Amlesh Kumar (Appellant), who was one of several accused in a criminal matter relating to dowry and the disappearance of his wife. 

• During the bail proceedings, the Investigating Officer (IO) submitted before the Patna High Court that all accused persons would undergo narco-analysis tests. 

• The High Court accepted this statement without checking if proper legal procedures, like voluntary consent and judicial oversight, had been followed.

• The Appellant approached the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court’s acceptance of the narco-analysis violated his fundamental rights under Articles 20 (3) and 21 of the Constitution and goes against Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010) which declared that narco-analysis and similar tests violate constitutional protections unless conducted voluntarily and under strict safeguards.

Judgment: The Supreme Court said:-

• No, the High Court was wrong to accept the submission for conducting narco-analysis on all accused.

• No, even if a narco-test is done voluntarily and with safeguards, its report cannot be the sole basis for conviction.

• Yes, an accused may voluntarily request a narco-test, but it is not an automatic or absolute right. The court must approve it based on the circumstances.

Case 10: Unregistered sale can’t confer title even if subsequent transaction is registered

Case Name: Mahnoor Fatima Imran v M/S Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt.

Relevant Provisions: 

Issues:

(i) Does registration of a sale deed automatically confer legal ownership?

(ii) Can a person claim ownership if the original seller had no valid title?

Facts:

• In 1975, 99.07 acres were declared surplus and vested with the State under land reform laws.

• In 1982, Bhavana Cooperative Housing Society signed an unregistered sale agreement with GPA holders of the former owners (who had no title by then).

• In 2006, the society attempted to “revalidate” the old agreement with altered terms, which was later found fraudulent.

• Buyers like Mahnoor Fatima Imran purchased land based on that invalid agreement and got registered sale deeds.

• When the Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation moved to redevelop the land, the buyers filed a writ petition under Article 226 to protect possession.

• Then the matter reached the Supreme Court. 

Judgment:

• The Supreme Court dismissed the buyers' claims, holding that:

  • A registered sale deed cannot transfer ownership if the seller lacks title.

  • The 1982 unregistered agreement and its 2006 revalidation were invalid.

  • Writ relief under Article 226 is not available if the petitioner has no lawful title.

Reasons:

• Registration ≠ Ownership: Registration is only a notice to the public, not proof of valid title.

• Section 49 of the Registration Act makes unregistered agreements inadmissible for property claims.

• Land had already vested with the State in 1975, so original owners had no right to sell.

Case 11: Prior approval of Competition Commission of India mandatory u/ IBC

Case Name: Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v Girish Sriram Juneja

Relevant Provision: 

Issues: 

(i) Must the approval of CCI for a proposed combination mandatorily precede the approval of the Resolution Plan by CoC under the proviso to Section 31(4) of IBC?

(ii) Did the NCLAT erred in holding that prior CCI approval before CoC approval is only a directory and not mandatory? 

(iii) Was the Resolution Plan approved by CoC in favour of AGI Greenpac legally valid despite the alleged lack of statutory approvals at the time of voting?

Facts:

• Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. (INSCO) challenged the approval of a Resolution Plan submitted by AGI Greenpac Ltd. to acquire Hindustan National Glass and Industries Ltd. (HNGIL), a major player in the glass packaging industry. 

• A key issue arose when AGI Greenpac's Resolution Plan was approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) without prior approval from the Competition Commission of India (CCI). INSCO contended that such approval was mandatory under Section 31(4) of the IBC, especially in cases involving combinations under the Competition Act, 2002.

• National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) ruled that while CCI approval was mandatory, its timing, whether before or after CoC approval, was directory, upholding AGI Greenpac's approval. INSCO challenged this ruling before the Supreme Court.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT judgment, holding that prior approval from the CCI before CoC approval is mandatory, not merely directory. The Court ruled that the statutory framework under the IBC and Competition Act requires compliance with the proviso to Section 31(4) IBC, which mandates obtaining CCI approval before a Resolution Plan involving a combination is put to a vote.

Case 12: Right of senior citizen to claim back their transferred property

Case Name: Urmila Dixit v Sunil Sharan Dixit

Relevant Provision: 

Issues:  

(i) Whether a property transferred by senior citizens by gift or any other medium can be claimed back under Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007

(ii) Whether the authorities under Section 23 of the Act can order eviction from the property and grant possession to the concerned senior citizens.

Facts:  

• Section 23 of the Act states that if the person who received property fails to care for the giver, the transfer can be cancelled, as if it were obtained by fraud or force. 

• A Gift Deed was executed by the mother in favour of her son which stated that the son would maintain the mother. 

• Allegedly, the same day, a vachan patra/promissory note was executed by the son stating that he will take care of the mother and father till the end of their life and if he does not do so, the mother will be at liberty to take back the Gift Deed. 

• In December 2020, the mother filed an application under Section 23 of the Act before the Sub Divisional Magistrate alleging attacks by the son regarding the further transfer of property. 

• She sought cancellation of the Deed as there was no love and affection left between the parties. This application was allowed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, and the deed was declared null and void. The son preferred an appeal, which was dismissed by the Collector. 

• The son then filed a writ petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. A Single-Judge Bench upheld the order of the Collector and dismissed the writ petition.

• The son then filed an appeal, and a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the order of the single judge and found the deed valid. Consequently, the mother filed an appeal in the Supreme Court.

Judgment:  

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Single-Judge Bench of the High Court and cancelled the Gift Deed because the conditions in the gift were not complied with. The Court also ruled that the authorities can order possession to be transferred.

Reasons for the Judgment:

Application of Section 23 of the Act

The Supreme Court, after scrutinising the Gift Deed and Promissory Note, held that the two ingredients necessary for the application of Section 23, as propounded in Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, 2022, i.e., the transfer should have a condition attached to it regarding maintenance and basic needs. The transferee failed to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor. 

Case 13: Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits negative discrimination

Case Name: Jyotsnamayee Mishra v State of Odisha

Relevant Provision: 

Issues: 

(i) Can an employee claim promotion to a post meant only for direct recruitment?
(ii) Can a government department fill a direct recruitment post through internal circulars instead of public advertisement?
(iii) Do previous instances of wrongful promotions justify granting similar relief to the petitioner under Article 14 (Right to Equality)?

Facts:

• The petitioner was appointed a Peon in 1978. In 1999, she submitted a representation seeking appointment as a tracer. The State responded by informing the petitioner in a letter dated 5 July 1999 that the position of Tracer will be filled by direct recruitment and is not a promotional position.

• Despite this, the petitioner claimed discrimination in promotions. The case was moved to the Principal Bench of the Tribunal in Bhubaneshwar, which ordered the State to consider her and other Class-IV employees' applications for promotion to Tracer in the event of future openings. 

• On January 2016, the Tribunal ordered her appointment as a Tracer and, if no vacancy was available, directed reversion of the last person promoted. 

• Challenging these orders, the State filed a petition before the Orissa High Court, arguing that the petitioner was ineligible. As the retiral benefits had been extended to the petitioner for the post of Peon, the High Court disposed of the Writ Petition accordingly.

• Aggrieved by this decision, she approached the Supreme Court.

Judgment:
The Supreme Court ruled that it would be against the law and fair selection principles for an employee to seek promotion to a position intended only for direct recruitment. 

Further, the Supreme Court decided it is against the Constitution and the statutory requirements for a government agency to use internal circulars rather than public advertisements to fill a position intended only for direct recruitment.

For clarity on equal protection before law and judicial interpretations, refer to the explainer on Article 14.

Case 14: Consequence of not informing grounds of arrest

Case Name: Vihaan Kumar v State of Haryana

Relevant Provisions:

Issues:

(i) Was the Appellant's arrest rendered illegal due to non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Constitution?
(ii) Whether the Appellant's treatment (handcuffing and chaining to a hospital bed) violated his fundamental right to dignity under Article 21.
(iii) Can subsequent legal processes (remand, chargesheet) validate an arrest vitiated by constitutional violations?

Facts: 

• The Appellant was arrested for offences under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, and 471 read with Section 120-B of the IPC. He filed a writ petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging his arrest as illegal, which was dismissed.

• Consequently, he appealed before the Supreme Court. 

• The Appellant claimed that he was arrested at 10:30 AM on 10 June 2024 and produced before a magistrate on 11 June 2024 at 3:30 PM, alleging a violation of Article 22(2) (failure to produce within 24 hours). 

• He further contended that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him, breaching Article 22(1). The State, however, asserted that the arrest occurred at 6:00 PM on 10 June 2024, complying with the 24-hour rule, and that the grounds were orally communicated.

• The Appellant, after arrest, was hospitalised where he was handcuffed and chained to a hospital bed. Photographic evidence corroborated this treatment, prompting the Supreme Court to issue notices to the hospital and police authorities. 

• The State later suspended the involved officers and initiated a departmental inquiry.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding the Appellant's arrest illegal due to non-compliance with Article 22(1). The Court ordered the Appellant's immediate release, quashed all subsequent remand orders, and directed the State of Haryana to issue guidelines prohibiting the handcuffing of accused persons in hospitals.

For a detailed breakdown of life and liberty protections, read the dedicated coverage on Article 21 and its evolving jurisprudence.

Case 15: Challenge to the expulsion of a member of the legislature

Case Name: Sunil Kumar Singh v Bihar Legislative Assembly

Relevant Provision: 

Issues:

(i) Whether the Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner is maintainable in view of Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the proceedings of the Ethics Committee are amenable to judicial review.
(ii) Can the Supreme Court exercise its writ jurisdiction to review the proportionality of the punishment imposed by the House?
(iii) If so, whether the Petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate to the misconduct attributed to him and whether it merits any interference?
(iv) Whether the Supreme  Court is empowered to determine the quantum of punishment that may be imposed on the Petitioner?

Facts: 

• The Petitioner, a member of the Rashtriya Janata Dal (“RJD”), filed a Writ Petition to challenge his expulsion from the Bihar Legislative Council (“BLC”). 

• The Petitioner was alleged of unparliamentary conduct during the Governor's address.

• After a formal complaint the BLC Chairman referred the matter to the Ethics Committee for inquiry. The Ethics Committee submitted its report recommending the Petitioner's expulsion.

• In July, 2024, the BLC adopted the report, leading to the Petitioner's expulsion.

• Subsequently, the BLC Secretariat issued a notification formally relieving the Petitioner of his membership. This expulsion was challenged by the Petitioner in the present case.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court quashed the punishment of expulsion of the Petitioner from the BLC for being disproportionate and excessive. The Court held that the prohibition under Article 212(1) only bars Constitutional Courts from reviewing the legislative proceedings for procedural irregularity. However, it does not prevent the judicial review of the legality or constitutionality of the legislature's actions (both lawmaking and administrative decisions).

Stay ahead with the most important judgments from 2018–2025. This curated course is your shortcut to mastering recent case law for CLAT PG and judiciary exams.